





ABSTRACT: This article addresses the issue of whether different
market institutions are accompanied by different degrees of efﬁciency
and symmetry of price transmission between the producer and retail
levels. It analyzes hog market institutions as they differ between the
North and the South regions of Vietnam. The paper uses a price
asymmetry model including an error correction term to reconcile
potential cointegration relations with symmetry. The analysis shows
that the market is efﬁcient in conveying accurate information, provided
public support institutions are in place.
INTRODUCTION
Several recent studies have analyzed the integration of agri-food markets to
determine whether marketing channels convey supply and demand shocks
efﬁciently, and thus provide the right incentives to producers (Fackler and
Goodwin, forthcoming; Sarker, 1995). The literature on traditional industrial
organization has looked at whether institutional factors play a role in determining
price. However, in Vietnam, there has been no data assembled to analyze either
market integration or market institutions. This paper contributes to the empirical
literature by linking price and institutional analyses focused on the hog market in
Vietnam. We analyze a time series of price data to evaluate the efﬁciency of the
transmission of supply and demand information in the marketing channel. The
context is postliberalization—characterized by poor contract enforcement mech-
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Vylder, 1996).
Previous research in the ﬁeld identiﬁed the institutional structure of hog
transactions taking place between producer and consumer levels in the North and
South of Vietnam (Le Goulven, 2000). The objective of this article is to evaluate
the degree of price transmission along the marketing channel in both regions.
When supply shocks are not efﬁciently conveyed to consumers, market interme-
diaries are beneﬁting from market imperfections and are reducing market
transparency. That hurts consumers’ welfare and producers’ incentives to increase
their production. We show that the market is efﬁcient at conveying accurate
information, provided public and formal support institutions are present.
BACKGROUND
Market Structure
In Vietnam, agriculture represents one-third of the GDP and employs 73% of the
economically active population. The livestock sector is a key sector to “accelerate
agricultural growth, contribute to the development of those regions where most of
the poor live, and exploit the potential for high-valued exports” (Goletti and Rich,
1998).
The hog market is still mainly backyard, small-scale production—80% of the
households are fattening one to two hogs per year (Le Ba Lich, 1996). Hog
production is a form of precautionary savings and often the only way for peasants
to get cash income (Le Goulven, 2000). Yet many small units add up—the sector
has an annual growth of 3.8%, and hog production generated 71% of the animal
husbandry gross output in 1995 (General Statistical Ofﬁce, 1996).
Because of the liberalization of the Vietnamese economy in the early 1990s and
as a result of rising average income, pork consumption increased from 8.5
kg/capita/year in 1992 (General Statistical Ofﬁce, 1994) to 10.1 kg in 1996 (Le
Goulven, 2000). Yet that ﬁgure is still low compared to neighboring Asian
countries where it stands around 30 kg/capita/year. However, the demand in the
countryside remains oriented toward fat pork, whereas the trend is for lean meat
in big cities such as Ha Noi in the North or Ho Chi Minh City in the South. On
average, pork consumption per capita per year is 77% higher in those two main
cities than in the countryside. Our analysis focuses on the supply of pork to Ha
Noi and Ho Chi Minh City, the two major cities. The growing demand in these
cities should be stimulating production via market signals. If the market allows
such information to be transmitted efﬁciently via prices, then producers can take
advantage of the opportunities to increase their production, thereby diversifying
their farm income away from rice and thus the ﬂuctuations of the international rice
market.
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transactions between the producer and consumer levels (Figure 1): the transaction
of live hogs between producers and assemblers (T1), and the transaction of pork
carcasses between assemblers and meat retailers (T2). In T1, assemblers buy hogs
from producers widely dispersed in the countryside, and in T2 they have to ﬁnd
buyers who are scattered in the city open markets. As a consequence of high
transaction costs, assemblers resort to agents’ services: upward to extend their
procurement area, and downward to kill the animals and sell the carcasses to meat
retailers. Since there is no refrigeration chain, hogs are transported live and then
slaughtered the same day, close to the place where pork is sold and consumed. No
meat processing plant (with a slaughtering line) is supplying the domestic market
with carcasses. Slaughterhouses are instead very basic setups where animals are
killed and dressed manually.
In the North, slaughterhouses are privately owned. Urban agents are slaugh-
terers in charge of killing the hogs and selling the carcasses to meat retailers. In
the South, slaughterhouses are publicly operated. Urban agents are brokers only,
in charge of selling carcasses on wholesale markets. Both types of agents are hired
Figure 1. Organization of the hog marketing channel in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese Hog Market 377by the assemblers and paid a ﬁxed price per kilo of carcasses sold according to the
services they provide.
Institutional Structure
The institutional analysis of the market uses data collected in a survey of 300
assemblers and other actors in the marketing chain in nine provinces throughout
the country. The analysis reveals that institutions governing hog transactions are
different in the North and the South. The results presented in detail in a previous
paper (Le Goulven, 2000) show that along the hog marketing chain, in Vietnam
as in other countries, there is strong uncertainty as to the quality of the products,
as well as the production cycle patterns and market conditions.
In T1, assemblers have to cope with uncertainties that concern hog yields (ratio
carcass weight/live weight), health (sanitary aspects), and fat content (percentage
of meat), since they are buying live animals and selling carcasses. These
uncertainties can lead to opportunistic behavior by producers trying to feed the
hogs before the transaction, or to hide the real state of health of the hogs from
buyers.
On the one hand, this risk can be partly reduced if one is able to evaluate the
quality of the carcass from a live hog. Such an estimation results from speciﬁc
knowledge each buyer can acquire by being taught or by learning-by-doing. This
knowledge is gained individually even if common criteria can usually be used.
On the other hand, speciﬁc contracts can be adopted as institutional mecha-
nisms to regulate the exchanges and reduce the risk of ex-ante opportunism. The
results from the survey reveal that actors coordinate through oral contracts that are
identiﬁed as relational contracts (Macneil, 1974), where the identity of the parties
and the social milieu within which the contract is consummated are relevant. The
terms of the contracts are such that information costs and actors’ risks are reduced.
The survey also showed that oral contracts in T1 are enforced by mutual trust built
between the two parties in repeated transactions. This trust is exchanged in the
same way as the product. If party A cheats at tn (the producer does not tell the
collector that his hog is sick), party B will either cheat at tn11 (the collector gives
a price which is not the real price of the market), or break the contract as a result
of loss of trust in the partner (the collector will never again buy hogs from this
producer). The social content of personal relations “carries strong expectations of
conﬁdence that the other will abstain from opportunism” (Granovetter, 1985).
In T2, uncertainties about the quality of the meat and the market conditions still
generate high transaction costs due mainly to the risk of perishability of the hogs
brought to town, and of the carcasses given a lack of refrigerating systems or
urban stockyards. To reduce these costs, assemblers resort to the services of urban
agents (slaughterers in the North, brokers in the South) that work with meat
retailers and provide a daily regularity in the selling of carcasses. Surveys reveal
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contracts enforced by mutual trust built between parties in repeated transactions.
The most important ﬁnding of the institutional analysis is that while mutual
trust is sufﬁcient to enforce T1 and T2 contracts in the South, it must be
accompanied by other means of enforcement in the North. There exist some hog
merchant networks composed of assemblers and their rural agents, who operate in
a geographic area corresponding to one or two districts. The merchant networks,
similar to the medieval Maghribi coalitions described by Greif (1993), are
fulﬁlling several functions in the North: (1) joint problem-solving arrangements
and solidarity between members that are effective for transport, for buying and
selling negotiations, and for informal relations with the police; (2) extension of the
areas of collection and the market by using the services of rural agents; (3)
guarantee of the quality of hogs going to urban areas by the sorting done by
merchants; (4) reduction in potential opportunistic behavior within the network.
The agency relations between assemblers and agents are enforced by the credible
threat of collective punishment, since information on past cheating behavior is
common knowledge of the network members; and (5) reduction of potential
opportunistic behavior outside the network. The agency relations between
assemblers and slaughterers are also enforced by the coalition. Nevertheless, the
enforcement power is limited to the area of the network. As slaughterers are
supplied by assemblers from several provinces, the threat of boycott by a network
from a district of a speciﬁc province is hardly credible.
The existence of the these networks not only favors mutual aid and sanctions
based on multilateral reputation (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1985), but they
also support the deﬁnition of collective rules for ﬁxing prices. The survey data
show that, within a network, merchants deﬁne daily a common price for the
purchase of hogs, and that they respect this common price when they buy
individually. The data also show that some merchants can be excluded from the
network if they consistently do not respect the common price.
Moreover, in the North, one assembler contracts with only one slaughterer—
but a slaughterer is the agent of assemblers from several regions. In addition to
being the agent of assemblers to kill the hogs and to sell the carcasses, a
slaughterer is providing services that maintain assemblers in a state of depen-
dency: (1) long-term credit is often offered by slaughterers to assemblers who also
provide them with private protection services against theft and police abuses
(illegal tax collection); (2) to facilitate the transport of hogs by assemblers,
slaughterers often register trucks owned by collectors in their names. Thus, there
is an important speciﬁc investment from slaughterers to assemblers that justiﬁes
the exclusive contracts system.
In the South of the country, brokers only sell carcasses. They do not provide
other services to assemblers, nor to retailers. Credit is provided by speciﬁc actors,
The Vietnamese Hog Market 379mainly Chinese families from the Cho Lon district of Ho Chi Minh City.
Therefore, products and credit markets are clearly segmented.
The institutional analysis of the hog market reveals two different organizations.
On the one hand, in the North, market institutions are private: private trader
networks reduce information costs and attenuate potential opportunism in rural
areas, and private actors provide services traditionally considered as public
(credit, slaughter) in the urban areas. On the other hand, in the South, market
institutions are mainly public: slaughterhouses are all ruled by local government
authorities that provide public services, and carcasses are sold in wholesale
auction markets.
These ﬁndings suggest a paradox: considering that Vietnamese collectivization
has been stronger and existed longer in the North—1954 to 1986—than in the
South—1975 to 1986, one would expect more public goods to be provided in the
North. The explanation lies in the cultural traits and historical heritage of both
regions that have shaped different types of societies and thus differences in market
embeddedness.
The cultural traits of the Vietnamese population are based on the association of
Confucianism and Buddhism. The former put the family and the lineage at the
center of social relations, whereas the latter supports a more contemplative and
individualistic attitude. Previous research showed how the natural resource
endowments of the North and the South of Vietnam, as well as the history of both
regions, have contributed to the expression of the collective and the individualistic
side of the culture, respectively (Le Goulven, 2000).
The natural conditions in the North have contributed to the development of
collective institutions to socialize individual risks: mutual aid for irrigation works
and collective storage of grain, and insurance systems for natural catastrophes
have been major institutions in the social organization of Northern villages.
Moreover, the North has been subject to very high demographic pressure, and to
several and recurrent conﬂicts with invaders. The rural collective was therefore
also organized for military defense.
In the South, the abundance of land, the low demographic pressure, and the
distribution of the population along canals and roads have deﬁned a different
social system, where the population is more oriented toward the outside and less
suspicious of foreign people. During the communist period, those differences
were maintained if not accentuated. The collectivization of agriculture and the
deﬁnition of the agricultural cooperative at the commune level conﬁrm the
isolation of traditional rural institutions independent from central government.
The South has been reluctant to collectivize and to submit to communist control.
Therefore, after the Renovation, the Southerners were more receptive to the
market economy that they had in any case experienced during the American
occupation. The functioning of the Northern system could be compared to a
collectivist system when contract enforcement is mainly based on the reputation
380 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001and trust that actors are building. Segregation exists in such a system, as actors
will preferentially interact with people from the same commune, group, or family.
The social functioning of the South is closer to the individualistic system
characterized by the importance of bilateral reputation.
The differences in market structures and institutions may lead to differences in
price formation along the marketing chain, and therefore to differences in the
efﬁciency of market signal transmission between producers and consumers.
Intermediaries in the marketing chain may exert some power in price formation so
that production (consumption) price increases (decreases) are passed on to
consumers (producers) more rapidly and perhaps more completely than produc-
tion (consumption) price decreases (increases). The market is then said to be
asymmetric and intermediaries are in a position to capture rents. We test this
hypothesis by evaluating the impact of alternative institutions—private and
informal in the North and public and formal in the South, as to their efﬁciency of
price transmission along the hog marketing chain.
METHOD
The question of whether there is symmetric response to price changes in markets
is not new in the agricultural economics literature. Most studies have focused on
vertical price relationships in the commodity marketing channels of developed
countries. Boyd and Brorsen (1996) found no evidence of asymmetry in the U.S.
pork marketing channel. Punyawadee et al. (1991) report limited short-run
asymmetry between pork markets in Ontario and Alberta. von Cramon–Taubadel
(1998) demonstrates that transmission between producer and wholesale pork
prices in northern Germany is asymmetric. Few of this sort of study have been
conducted in developing countries where access to price information is difﬁcult.
To address the question of price transmission, Wolffram (1971) and Houck



















p,t are the price changes for retail pork in the urban
area, the positive price changes for live hogs in the rural area, and the negative
price changes for live hogs in the rural area at time t respectively, b0, b
*, and b
2
are coefﬁcients, t is the current time period and et the error term. Asymmetry is
tested by determining whether b
1 5 b
2. Boyd and Brorsen (1988) modiﬁed (1)
and made it dynamic using lagged prices to test for both price asymmetry and the
speed of price adjustment. If we call PRt, PPPt, and NPPt, the values of SDPr,t,




p,t, respectively, and if we add m lags in (1), we obtain the
following speciﬁcation:








2 NPPt2m 1« t (2)
PRt stands for the retail price change in the urban area. PPPt and NPPt are the
variables denoting the rising and falling phases of live hog farm gate prices
respectively and are computed via the Houck procedure. Following Bailey and
Brorsen (1989), two asymmetry hypotheses can be tested in (2). The ﬁrst null
hypothesis is that the aggregate impact of live hog price increases and decreases










The second null hypothesis is that the speed of adjustment is the same for both








Rejecting the ﬁrst hypothesis implies that the two price series would tend to drift
apart over time as a result of imperfect information, time lags in information ﬂow,
market power, or constraints to arbitrage (Punyawadee, 1991). Rejecting the
second hypothesis indicates that the rate of adjustment differs for positive and
negative price changes, that is, price asymmetry.
When (2) is estimated without regard to the time series nature of the data used,
spurious correlations can arise if Pr,t and Pp,t are nonstationary. Nevertheless, the
two variables can be cointegrated, meaning that Pr,t 5 a0 1 a1Pp,t 1 ut with
ut being stationary (Engle and Granger, 1987). If so, Granger and Lee (1989)
propose a modiﬁcation to (2) that makes it possible to test for asymmetry between
nonstationary but cointegrated variables:





1 b4~L!DPp,t21 1« t (3)
where ECT is the error correction term such as ECT 5 ECT
1 1 ECT
- and
ECTt21 5 ut21 5 Pr,t21 2 a0 2 a1Pp,t21, and b3(L) and b4(L) are lagged
polynomials. In (3), the null hypothesis of symmetry therefore becomes:
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The inclusion of the error correction term in (3) reconciles potential cointegration
relations with symmetry analysis. However, von Cramon–Taubadel (1998) points
out that simultaneity between Pr and Pp and data frequency can inﬂuence attempts
to measure asymmetry, and notes that weekly data are sufﬁcient for price
transmission analysis in European pork markets. To avoid inconsistent estimation
because of potential simultaneity between prices, he also suggests testing for weak
exogeneity of the variables in the model. The method used is the one introduced
by Boswijk and Urbain (1997) where the error correction representation in (3) is
completed by a marginal model for Pp:
DPp,t 5 g0 1 g1~L!DPr,t1 1 g2~L!DPp,t21 1 nt (4)
The weak exogenity of Pp with respect to the short run parameter is tested by a
variable addition test of the error correction term ECTt-1 in (4).
DATA AND RESULTS
Data used in the study include weekly prices of live hog and pork from ten
provinces in Vietnam. The data were collected by the Vietnamese Institute for
Markets and Prices from January 1993 to June 1998 (264 observations). Producer
prices in the North are represented by average live hog prices in the provinces of
Vinh Phu, Ha Tay, Nam Dinh, and Nghe, which are the areas supplying Ha Noi
regularly. Retail prices in the North are the average prices of ham in Ha Noi
markets. Producer prices in the South are represented by average live hog prices
in the provinces of Dong Nai, Quang Ngai, Tieng Giang, and Vinh Long, which
are Ho Chi Minh City’s major suppliers. Retail prices in the South are the average
prices of ham in Ho Chi Minh City markets.
All data are deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index provided by the
Department of Trade and Price Statistics in Ha Noi. Using the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), we fail to reject the null hypothesis
of nonstationarity for each time series (Table 1). Pp and Pr in both regions may,
therefore, be cointegrated. The Johansen (1988, 1990) procedure is then used to
test for cointegration between Pp and Pr in both regions. Results from the tests are
presented in Table 2 and show that Pp and Pr are not cointegrated in the North but
are cointegrated in the South. Therefore, to analyze vertical price transmission and
asymmetry in the hog marketing chain in Vietnam, we use model (2) for the North
and models (3) and (4) for the South.
The Vietnamese Hog Market 383Price Transmission and Symmetry in the North
As Pp and Pr are not cointegrated, we ﬁrst test for Granger (1969) causality to
determine which price series is the dependent variable to be used in (2)
(Monhanty, Peterson, Kruse, 1995). The series to be included in the test of
Granger causality have to be stationary. However, Sims et al. (1990) demonstrate
that causality tests can be conducted on series which are not stationary in levels
but are stationary in differences, by estimating a vector auto-regressive represen-
tation of the ﬁrst-differenced series. The results of the ADF test conducted on the
ﬁrst differences of Pp and Pr are presented in Table 3 and show that the null
hypothesis of stationarity is rejected for both series at one percentage signiﬁcance.
The results of the test for causality
2 show that in the North, DPp causes DPr. DPr
thus becomes the dependent variable in (2). The variables are then segmented
following the Houck procedure (Table 5).
Model (2) is estimated using the least-squares method (Monhanty, Peterson,
and Kruse, 1995). Lags are included in the model until there are no more
signiﬁcant effects (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987). After two lags, there is no more
signiﬁcant effect between the two variables. It implies that price adjustments at
the retail level are occurring from one to two weeks after a shock emerging at the
production level.
Focusing on Table 6, note ﬁrst that the R
2 is 0.96, which means that nearly all
the ﬂuctuations of the retail prices of pork in Ha Noi are explained by ﬂuctuations
in the live hog production price in rural areas supplying the city. Second, the
Table 1. Results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for Pp et Pr in the
North and in the South
Variables t-stat (f) Lags
Critical Values of the Test
1% 5% 10%
Pp North 21.50 4 23.457 22.872 22.572
Pr North 21.63 6 23.457 22.872 22.572
Pp South 22.24 5 23.457 22.872 22.572
Pr South 22.25 5 23.457 22.872 22.572
Note: The number of lags is chosen according to information criteria (Akaike and Schwarz) so that there is no autocorrelation in the
residuals.
Table 2. Test for Cointegration between Pp et Pr using Johansen Method
Trace Statistic Trace (0.90)
H0
Trace (0.95) lmaxStatistic lmax (0.90) lmax (0.95)
North
r 5 0 15.62 17.79 19.00 13.56 13.75 15.67
r 5 1 2.05 7.50 9.138 7.52 9.24 9.24
South
r 5 0 43.86** 17.79 19.00 39.95** 13.75 15.67
r 5 1 3.88 7.50 9.138 3.88 9.24 9.24
Note: ** 5 signiﬁcant at 5%.
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retail prices react to an extent beyond the shocks occurring at the production level.
It seems that adjustments occur within the week, and data of a higher frequency
would be necessary to examine the process of price transmission more precisely.
And third the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients differs for increases and decreases in
production prices. Only contemporaneous coefﬁcients for increases in production
price (PPPt) are signiﬁcant, whereas coefﬁcients for decreases of production price
are signiﬁcant for both contemporaneous (NPPt) and lagged prices (NPPt-1,
NPPt-2). This suggests that retail prices react more rapidly when the margin is
squeezed than when it is stretched. Those results are corroborated by the test of
the two-asymmetry hypothesis. The F;test of the ﬁrst hypothesis indicates that
the total impacts of production price increases and decreases on retail price
changes are different. The F statistics of the second hypothesis indicate that the
retail price response to price increases differs from that of price decreases at the
production level. Empirical results therefore demonstrate that price transmission
between the production and the retail levels of the hog market in the North of
Vietnam are asymmetric.
Price Transmission and Symmetry in the South
Equation (3) is ﬁrst estimated with Pr as the dependent variable
3, with six
lagged differences for both Pp and Pr and then reduced to the most parsimonious
model corrected for both auto-correlation and partial auto-correlation of the
residuals. Results of the estimation are presented in Table 7. Following Boswijk
and Urbain (1997), we test for weak exogeneity with respect to the long-run
parameter by adding the estimated segmented error correction term to (4). Results
in Table 8 show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity with
respect to the long-run parameters for the producer price. Then a variable addition
is used to test the signiﬁcance of n ˆt, the residuals from the marginal model (4), in
Table 3. Results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for DPp and DPr in
the North
Variables t-stat (f) Lags
Critical Values of the Test
1% 5% 10%
DPp 27.06** 5 23.457 22.872 22.572
DPr 216.93** 0 23.457 22.872 22.572
Note: ** 5 signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4. Results of the Granger causality test between DPp and DPr
H0 F-stat Pr
DPp does not cause DPr 4.21053 0.00257
DPr does not cause DPp 1.08237 0.36574
The Vietnamese Hog Market 385the structural model (3). The results in Table 7 indicate that n ˆt is not signiﬁcant
in the equation, that is, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that producer prices
are weakly exogenous with respect to the short-run parameters in (3). Both tests
conﬁrm our choice of estimating (3) with Pr as a dependent variable.
Returning to Table 7, note that the positive error correction term (ECTt21
1 )i s
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the equation, whereas the negative error correction
term (ECTt21
2 ) is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The difference in the value of
the associated coefﬁcients suggests that increases in producer prices are transmit-
ted more efﬁciently to retail prices than are producer price decreases. However,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry, (b2
1 5 b2
2), using an F;test
(1,3638; Pr 5 0,2429). Empirical results support the hypothesis that retail prices
in Ho Chi Minh City react in a symmetric way to changes in producer prices in
the supplying provinces.
Table 5. Segmentation of the Independent Variable According to the
Houck Procedure
Pr,t PRt Pr,t 2 Pr,0 Pp,t DPp,t PPPt ¥DPp,t
1 NPPt ¥DPp,t
2
13000 0 6875 — — —
12890 2110 6693 2182 0 2182
12289 2711 6636 257 0 2239
13159 159 6604 232 0 2271
13047 47 6524 280 0 2351
13054 54 6551 27 27 2351
13060 60 6748 197 224 2351
13066 66 6751 3 227 2351
12588 2412 6742 29 227 2360
12582 2418 6787 45 272 2360
Table 6. Estimation of the Model (2) of
Transmission Asymmetry between Pp and Pr in
the North (dependent variable 5 PRt)





























Note: * 5 signiﬁcant at 5%, ** 5 signiﬁcant at 1%.
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In the North, the diversity of supply regions to the slaughterers enhances
competition. But competition is limited by the rigidity of the supply contracts
maintained by networks of merchants for the slaughterers to have their speciﬁc
investments reimbursed, thereby reducing arbitrage for assemblers. The merchant
networks, using exclusive supply contracts, allow traders to inﬂuence the
transmission of price shocks and are therefore explanatory variables for the
asymmetrical price transmission along the marketing channel in the North.
In the South, the collective formal institutions, that is, the People’s Committee
and the wholesale markets they have created, have an indirect effect that
stimulates large-scale competition. The concentration of the selling of the
carcasses in wholesale markets favors the competition among the assemblers of
all the supplying areas and thus among different provinces in the rural supplying
Table 7. Estimations of the
Error Correction Structural
Model (3) (dependent variable:
DPr,t)













Notes: * 5 signiﬁcant at 5%, ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
f 5 variable addition test for the residuals of the marginal
model (4) (test of weak exogeneity of Pp with respect to the
short-run parameters).
Table 8. Estimations of the
Marginal Model (4) for Pp
(dependent variable: DPp,t)







fECT1 et ECT1 20,0365
Notes: * 5 signiﬁcant at 5%, ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
f 5 variable addition test for the residuals of the marginal
model (4) (test of weak exogeneity of Pp with respect to the
long-run parameters).
The Vietnamese Hog Market 387areas. Public institutions that enhance competition among traders and reduce
collusive behavior thus condition the symmetrical and ﬂuid price shocks trans-
mission in the Southern marketing channel.
CONCLUSION
The empirical analysis supports a point raised in the institutional analysis: the
difference in the institutional structure of the hog market in Vietnam may have an
impact on its efﬁciency. In the North, where market institutions are private,
producer prices and retail prices do not exhibit a common long-run equilibrium.
Moreover, price transmission between the producer and the retail levels is
asymmetric. The margin of market intermediaries is corrected more rapidly when
it is squeezed than when it is stretched. In the South, where market institutions are
public, producer prices and retail prices are cointegrated—linked by a common
long-run equilibrium toward which they both converge. Even though changes in
producer prices are not transmitted within one week to retail prices, price
transmission is symmetric. As a consequence, hog and pork prices in the South
allow for supply shocks (climatic shocks, ﬂoods, disease) to be transmitted more
efﬁciently along the marketing channel, thus contributing to the development of
hog production according to market signals. These ﬁndings suggest that there
exist more incentives for producers to develop and diversify their production, and
to reduce rural poverty where public institutions and local governments structure
markets in Vietnam. Moreover, it is highlighted that market competition is more
effective where public rather than private support institutions exist. To favor
competition in transition countries, government policy options should consider
enabling conditions for private competition as a means of improving competitive
conditions rather than expect privatization alone to succeed providing the right
economic incentives.
Showing that “institutions matter” is no novelty as donors have acknowledged
it since the Asian Miracle, and praised it in the ensuing Annual Conferences on
Development Economics. In the broad “ institutions matter ” frame of mind, one
might be tempted to transfer the Southern institutional structure of the hog market
to the North. But it would overlook differences in market embeddedness in both
locations. Following national directives, the Ha Noi People’s Committee also
aims at centralizing slaughter to better switch to public plants. Forums are also
organized with traders in an attempt to create wholesale markets in the capital.
However, our survey shows that in Ha Noi, traders have no personal incentive to
work together. In a tradition where disputes are solved in a family or community
context, they do not trust the intervention of a local administration that hardly has
power to enforce new rules. Market efﬁciency is not only a result of market
388 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001structure but also of market social embeddedness and history that determine the
nature of the institutions governing transactions.
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NOTES
1. Vietnam. is today the second world exporter of rice. The falling of the price of rice in the
international market in 1997 has affected Vietnamese rural incomes tremendously, creating a
loss of 400 million US dollars, according to the estimations done by Barbe ´.
2. To test for causality four regressions are necessary (1) DPp on its own lagged values DPp
m, (2)
DPp on its own lagged values DPp
m and the lagged values DPr
m, (3) DPr on its own lagged
values DPr
m, and (4) DPr on its own lagged values DPr
m and on the lagged values DPp
m. Then
we test whether the coefﬁcients for the lagged values of DPr
m in (2) and for the lagged values
of DPp
m in (4) are null. The respective null hypothesis are that DPr does not cause DPp and
DPp does not cause DPr. Results in Table 4 give the F statistics for each of the null hypothesis.
3. Using the Johansen procedure, the null hypothesis that the factor loading for Pp in the
cointegration equation equals zero is not rejected. This implies that Pp is weakly exogenous
with respect to the parameters of the long-run stationary relation linking the two prices. Thus
(3) is estimated with Pr as the dependent variable.
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